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INTRODUCTION
As developed in the Introduction to this symposium, the Warren Court
criminal procedure revolution came with a cost.1 Journalist Fred Graham wrote
that some of the Court’s decisions produced a “self-inflicted wound.”2
Commentators believe that the Court’s criminal procedural revolution tipped the
1968 Presidential election to Richard Nixon, who then rapidly altered the
composition of the Supreme Court with four appointments in his first two years of
office.3
* Michael Vitiello, Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of
Law; University of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I want to extend special thanks to
Joanne Gothard and Cameron Graber for their capable research assistance with this article.
1. Many Americans were troubled by Supreme Court decisions, believing the Court to be too lenient on
defendants and blaming the Court for rapidly rising crime rates. See Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Causes of Crime,
38 PUB. OP. QUARTERLY 288, 292 (1974) (listing 1969 Louis Harris & Assoc. poll showing 51% and 23% of
Americans believed “Supreme Court decisions protecting rights of accused” were a “Major Cause” and “Minor
Cause” of “an increase in crime,” respectively); see also id. at 294 (detailing a Gallup poll showing 63% of
Americans in 1968, and 75% of Americans in 1969, believed “the courts” were “not harsh enough” when “dealing
with criminals.”); see also James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
May 1972, https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/politics/crime/crimewar.htm (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
2. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 153–93 (1970).
3. LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 243–49 (1983); see also EARL M. MALTZ, THE
COMING OF THE NIXON COURT: THE 1972 TERM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2016);
KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL
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The Warren Court had many critics. Commentators continue to question the
legitimacy of the Warren Court’s Criminal Procedure revolution.4 Others doubt its
wisdom.5 Some critics have argued that the Warren Court’s attention to procedural
protections came with a cost to racial justice.6 For example, in his widely
acclaimed book, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, the late William
Stuntz argued that the Warren Court deserves much of the blame for the collapse
of the American criminal justice system.7 Specifically, he claimed that the Warren
Court’s reliance on due process, rather than on equal protection, led to the
appearance that the Court was coddling violent offenders at the expense of
innocent victims in their protection of African-Americans.8 The backlash against
the Court led to increased punishment, and to the War on Drugs.9
Those of us who support the Warren Court’s criminal revolution might address
any number of criticisms leveled against the Court.10 Instead, this paper focuses on
one specific criticism. Professor George Thomas, a participant in this symposium,
has argued that the Warren Court was overly concerned with procedural
protections,11 and that those protections often advanced values unrelated to the
CONSEQUENCES 37–62 (2011); William G. Ross, The Supreme Court as an Issue in Presidential Campaigns, 37
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 322, 331 (2012).
4. See, e.g., RICHARD Y. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTERREVOLUTION? THE WARREN COURT AND
THE BURGER COURT: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN MODERN AMERICA 297–325 (1977) (arguing the
“nationalizing” aspect of the Warren Court’s decision-making “was not unique to the Warren Court”); see also
Robert Weisberg, Criminal Procedure Doctrine: Some Versions of the Skeptical, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
832 (1985); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really
So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices in THE BURGER COURT 62, 63 (Vincent Blasi ed.
1983) (arguing that, “more often than not, [the Warren Court’s] criminal procedure decisions reflected a pattern
of moderation and compromise,” despite its “public reputation as a bold, crusading court.”).
5. See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1441 (1985) (attacking the
underlying premise of Miranda as, inter alia, an unethical attempt to give suspects a “sporting chance”); see also
Louis Michel Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 744 (1992) (arguing that Warren’s most
controversial cases are “best characterized as a retreat from the promise of liberal individualism brilliantly
camouflaged under the cover of bold advance.”); RICHARD A. LEO & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, eds., THE MIRANDA
DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING (1998).
6. E.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive Punishment,
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411 (2002); see also Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops?
A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 827 (2017) (reaching the conclusion that Miranda has “made it noticeably more difficult for police
officers to obtain confessions.”); WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (2011);
but see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social
Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 501 (1996).
7. See STUNTZ, supra note 6, at 9 (arguing “the ways the [Warren] Court exacerbated the inequality and
instability that plagued late twentieth-century criminal justice.”).
8. Id. at 225–36.
9. See id. at 244–81 (“By providing focal points for public anger, the coincidence of urban race riots and
pro-defendant Warren Court decisions like Mapp and Miranda helped to nationalize the backlash and made it
more extreme when it came.”).
10. Along the way we might agree with some of the criticisms without losing faith in the larger body of
work.
11. E.g., GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM
SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS (2008); see also George C. Thomas III, Through a Glass Darkly: Seeing the
Real Warren Court Criminal Justice Legacy, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2005) (proposing that “once Nixon
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protection of the innocent.12 Thomas has also argued that the primary goal of our
criminal justice system should be the protection of innocent defendants, and that
the Warren Court justices were indifferent to offenders’ guilt or innocence,
offering only procedural remedies.13
This paper disputes Thomas’s view of the Warren Court in one particular area,
wherein I argue that the Warren Court was on a path that would have provided
meaningful protection for innocent defendants: The Warren Court’s efforts to
protect against unreliable eyewitness identification. In United States v. Wade14 and
Gilbert v. California,15 the Court held that post-indictment eyewitness
identification was a critical stage of criminal proceedings, requiring the presence
of counsel. Gilbert also held that even if a witness made an identification at a lineup
without counsel present, the witness might make an in-court identification as long
as the prosecution could establish an independent basis for such evidence.16
Finally, in Stovall v. Denno,17 the Court held that the Wade-Gilbert holding did not
apply retroactively. Nonetheless, the Court in Stovall found that if an identification
procedure was so “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification,” the court must suppress the evidence because its use at trial would
otherwise violate due process.18
Within just a few years after the Burger Court’s inception, the Court eroded
many of the Warren Court decisions past recognition.19 The Burger Court held that
Wade-Gilbert protection applied only after commencement of formal
proceedings20 and had no application to a photo array or “show-up.”21 Thus, the
appearance of counsel at a lineup, as a matter of constitutional protection,
continues to be exceedingly rare.22
This paper argues that Justice Brennan’s majority opinions in Wade-Gilbert
appointed four new justices, the [Warren Court] liberal belief in procedure rather than substance began to appear
naïve.”); George C. Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process and the Protection of
Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169 (2005).
12. See Thomas, Road Not Taken, supra note 11, at 170 (“[T]he road taken by the Warren Court . . . did
not produce a fair and just process . . . it harmed innocent defendants.”). One might debate, for example, whether
the Warren Court’s extension of the exclusionary rule, thereby limiting arbitrary police searches, was legitimate,
even though enforcement of the Fourth Amendment most immediately protects guilty offenders. Protection for
the innocent is less direct and defies calculation: only if police fail to stop, detain and search innocent individuals
because they have been deterred by the Fourth Amendment do innocent individuals benefit from the Fourth
Amendment.
13. See Thomas, Road Not Taken, supra note 11, at 7–8 (“Anyone who was designing a criminal justice
process from scratch would, I think, worry less about the privacy rights of guilty suspects and more about
protecting the innocent from being convicted.”).
14. 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967).
15. 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
16. Id.
17. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
18. Id. at 302.
19. Infra Part II & Part III.
20. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
21. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973).
22. THOMAS, SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at 164–65.
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were ambiguous: Were they really Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases, as
most commentators see them?23 Alternatively, were they Confrontation Clause
cases?24 If they were Confrontation Clause cases, they were about protecting
innocent defendants from unjust convictions.25 In addition, the Warren Court’s
ruling in Stovall, upholding the admissibility of identifications made under
obviously suggestive circumstances, is certainly open to criticism. Despite that,
shortly before the end of the Warren Court, the Court demonstrated a commitment
to protecting potentially innocent defendants from unnecessarily suggestive
procedures in Foster v. California. Foster demonstrates that the Court’s due
process test could have teeth. This paper explores the implications of my argument
that the Wade trilogy was grounded in the Confrontation Clause, rather than the
traditional, narrow interpretation as right to counsel cases. Notably, a suspect
might have been entitled to protection under the Confrontation Clause in settings
where she would have no protection under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.26
As such, the Warren Court could have provided protection against one of the most
common causes resulting in the conviction of innocent defendants: eyewitness
misidentification.27
Part I of this article reviews the Court’s eyewitness identification case law, and
makes two points: After reviewing the Wade-Gilbert cases, the article evaluates
the Burger Court’s rapid erosion of the Wade-Gilbert protections.28 Second, while
those cases were largely rendered irrelevant by the Burger Court, Wade and Gilbert
were ambiguous about whether the Court grounded their holdings in the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel or the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.29 Part
II reviews Stovall, the third case in the Court’s 1967 trilogy.30 Even if one
recognizes that Stovall’s result appears indefensible, the Warren Court elsewhere
demonstrated a commitment to protecting innocent defendants from unduly
suggestive identification procedures.31 Part III explores the question, “what if?”
i.e. had the Court not moved so far to the right so quickly, how might Wade-Gilbert
have evolved into far more meaningful protection, that would most likely favor
innocent defendants, than the Burger Court provided?32 Indeed, some of the
developments in state legislatures and lower courts that provide meaningful relief
23. E.g., Alan K. Austin, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1974); Howard B.
Eisenberg & Bruce G. Feustel, Pretrial Identification: An Attempt to Articulate Constitutional Criteria, 58 MARQ.
L. REV. 659 (1975); see also Carl McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 235 (1970) (“[Wade and Gilbert] involved extensions of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
. . .”).
24. Infra Part II.
25. Infra Part II.
26. Infra Part IV.
27. Infra Part IV.
28. Infra Part I.
29. Infra Part I.
30. Infra Part III.
31. Infra Part III.
32. Infra Part IV.
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for suspects are consistent with the view that the Wade-Gilbert trilogy holdings
were about protecting a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause (i.e. the
right to confront witnesses against him).33
I. WADE AND GILBERT
In 1967, the Court decided Wade,34 Gilbert,35 and Stovall,36 all dealing with
pre-trial identification proceedings. The Court seemed to ground its holdings in
Wade and Gilbert on the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel clause, but with
considerable ambiguity.37 The Court also seemed to ground the need for counsel
on the Confrontation Clause: Without counsel’s involvement, a defendant was
unable to effectively confront the witness who identified him.38 This section
reviews those cases and then explores how the Burger Court cabined the
protections hoped for in Wade and Gilbert.
In Wade, the defendant was indicted for his participation in a bank robbery.39
Following his arrest, the court appointed counsel for the defendant.40 Two weeks
later, FBI agents placed the defendant in a lineup so that the bank employees could
determine if Wade was the robber.41 The employees identified Wade.42 At trial, on
cross-examination, both employees testified concerning their identification of
Wade at the pretrial lineup.43 Wade’s counsel objected to the witnesses’s in-court
identification because of the out-of-court denial of the right to counsel.44
In Gilbert, formal proceedings had also begun against the defendant45 when
the police used an unusually suggestive pretrial identification proceeding: About
100 witnesses to several robberies allegedly committed by the defendant identified

33. Infra Part IV.
34. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
35. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
36. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
37. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 226–27 (“The security of [the accused’s right to a fair trial] is as much the aim
of the right to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of the Sixth Amendment—the right of the accused to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
and his right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.”).
38. Id. at 235 (“Insofar as the accused’s conviction may rest on a courtroom identification in fact the fruit
of a suspect pretrial identification which the accused is helpless to subject to effective scrutiny at trial, the accused
is deprived of that right of cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to his right to confront the witnesses
against him.”).
39. Id. at 220.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 269 (1967) (Police conducted the lineup “without notice to his
counsel in a Los Angeles auditorium 16 days after his indictment and after appointment of counsel.”).
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him in each other’s presence.46 At trial, the prosecution relied on both the
witnesses’s out-of-court and in-court identifications of Gilbert.47
The Wade and Gilbert decisions held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel extended to out-of-court lineup procedures. Because the government had
not relied on the out-of-court identification in Wade, the Court remanded the case
to determine whether the in-court identification was the product of the uncounseled
out-of-court lineup.48 Gilbert held that the state could not rely on the uncounseled
out-of-court identification at all, although it might demonstrate that the in-court
identification had an independent source.49
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, seemed to ground the holding in the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel clause.50 The opinion relied explicitly on Sixth
Amendment right to counsel cases and focused on whether the pretrial lineup was
a “critical stage” of the proceeding using a classic right to counsel analysis.51
Although the opinion relied on analysis from Powell v. Alabama,52 a preincorporation due process case, and Miranda v. Arizona,53 a Fifth Amendment
right to counsel case, its discussion focused on the meaningful role of counsel as
developed in those cases.54 The opinion also cited Massiah v. United States,55
which involved police conduct that took place after the government had indicted
the defendant. As developed below, viewing Wade and Gilbert narrowly as Sixth
Amendment right to counsel cases allowed the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to
render Wade-Gilbert protection almost meaningless.56 However, that narrow view
failed to acknowledge the ambiguity in Justice Brennan’s opinions.57
Wade-Gilbert determined that the line-up was a “critical stage” of criminal
proceedings because of the need for counsel to protect a defendant’s right to
confront the witness against him.58 As developed more fully below, treating Wade-

46. Id. at 270.
47. Id. at 271.
48. Wade, 388 U.S. at 242.
49. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272–74.
50. See id. at 272 (“We there held [in Wade] that police conduct of such a lineup without notice and in the
absence of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and calls in question the
admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications . . .”) (emphasis added).
51. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37; see also Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
52. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
53. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
54. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 227 (“[T]he principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that
we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is
necessary to preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to crossexamine the witnesses against him . . . .”).
55. Id.
56. See discussion supra Part I.
57. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 501
(6th ed. 2017); see also id. at 499–500 regarding the ambiguity of Wade’s constitutional foundation.
58. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 224–25 (“[T]oday’s law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations
of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modern criminal prosecution, our
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Gilbert as right to confrontation cases would have produced a dramatically
different legal landscape, one far more protective of innocent defendants than the
one we have today.59 Here is some of the language suggesting that counsel was a
prophylaxis to protect a defendant’s right-to-confrontation: “. . . in this case it is
urged that the assistance of counsel at the lineup was indispensable to protect
Wade’s most basic right as a criminal defendant—his right to a fair trial at which
the witnesses against him might be meaningfully cross-examined.”60
In addition to references regarding the right to confront witnesses, Justice
Brennan highlighted the risks associated with eye-witness identification
procedures: The improperly suggestive procedures “probably account[] for more
miscarriages of justice than any other single factor . . . .”61 Once a witness has
identified a suspect as the perpetrator, the witness seldom retracts the identification
in open court.62 Further, in language that echoes the role of counsel in the Miranda
setting, Justice Brennan discussed the role of counsel at a lineup: Counsel
seemingly would be able to identify and perhaps prevent unduly suggestive
influences that would otherwise make cross-examination at trial meaningless.63
Hence, as with Miranda, the Court seemed to require counsel to protect another
right: the right to confrontation.
That was not to be. The Burger Court began to narrow Wade-Gilbert
protections almost immediately. In subsequent cases, the Court narrowed the
reading of Wade-Gilbert so extensively that one suspects counsel almost never
attends a lineup.64
Except for a brief moment, the Court continues to hold that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only after the state has begun formal
proceedings. The notable, short-lived exception was Escobedo v. Illinois.65 There,
cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to ‘critical’ stages of the proceedings. The
guarantee reads: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence [sic].’ (Emphasis supplied.) The plain wording of this guarantee thus encompasses counsel’s
assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful ‘defence [sic].’”).
59. Infra Part II.
60. Wade, 388 U.S. at 223–24.
61. Id. at 228–29.
62. See id. at 229 (quoting Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades I, CRIM. L. REV. 479, 482
(1963) (“[I]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the lineup, he
is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity may (in the absence of other
relevant evidence) for all practical purposes be determined there and then, before the trial.”).
63. See id. at 231–32 (“In short, the accused’s inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that
occurred at the lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility of the
witness’ courtroom identification.”); c.f. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 445 (1964) (“An understanding of
the nature and setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential to our decisions today. The difficulty in depicting
what transpires at such interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they have largely taken place
incommunicado.”).
64. I was unable to find any data on how often counsel attends post-formal charge line-ups. As a matter of
common sense, prosecutors prefer pre-indictment line-ups for many reasons, including the need to be sure that
the suspect is the right person before formal charges are brought and the desire to avoid the cumbersome
involvement of counsel at a line-up.
65. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

873

2020 / The Warren Court’s Eyewitness Identification Case Law
a suspect in police custody requested, and was denied, the right to see his
attorney.66 Despite the absence of formal charges, the Court held that the
defendant’s right to counsel was violated, at least on the facts of the case, once the
police had “focused” on the defendant.67 Two years later, Miranda shifted the
analysis from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the Fifth Amendment right
to be free from being compelled to be a witness against oneself when the police
engage in custodial interrogation.68
Perhaps—not surprisingly—after Wade-Gilbert, lower courts were divided on
whether a suspect had a right to counsel at a pre-indictment lineup.69 In effect,
lower courts were at odds as to whether Wade and Gilbert were pure Sixth
Amendment right to counsel cases or whether the constitutional right at stake was
the right to confront witnesses at trial, protected by the Confrontation Clause.70
The newly constructed Burger Court resolved that question in 1972 when it
decided Kirby v. Illinois.71
In Kirby, the police arrested the defendant and secured an identification before
he had been formally charged.72 The Court divided 5-4 in its holding.73 Justice
Stewart’s plurality opinion (subsequently adopted as the law by a majority of the
Court)74 held that Wade-Gilbert applied only after commencement of formal
proceedings.75 Notably, Nixon appointees Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun and

66. See id. at 481 (“Notwithstanding repeated requests by each, petitioner and his retained lawyer were
afforded no opportunity to consult during the course of the entire interrogation.”).
67. See id. at 490–91 (“We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police
have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied
‘The Assistance of Counsel’ in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as ‘made obligatory upon
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,’ Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 342, 83 S.Ct., at 795 and that no
statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.”).
68. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439 (“The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts
of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution
in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained
from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure
that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled
to incriminate himself.”).
69. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 500.
70. Id. at 501.
71. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
72. See id. at 684 (“In the present case we are asked to extend the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule
to identification testimony based upon a police station showup that took place before the defendant had been
indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense.”).
73. See Kirby, 406 U.S. 682 (Mr. Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in
which The Chief Justice , Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join; Mr. Justice Powell filed
statement concurring in the result; Mr. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas
and Mr. Justice Marshall joined; Mr. Justice White filed a dissenting statement).
74. See generally United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 322 (1973); see also discussion infra.
75. See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688 (“In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to the Court’s
landmark opinion in Powell v. Alabama, it has been firmly established that a person’s Sixth and Fourteenth
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William Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart’s opinion.76 Justice Powell, the fourth
Nixon appointee, concurred and stated tersely that he would not extend WadeGilbert’s per se exclusionary rule.77
In Kirby, Justice Brennan wrote for three of the dissenting justices arguing that
the plurality’s characterization of the issue was wrong.78 Justice Stewart framed
the Kirby issue as whether the Court should “extend” the Court’s holdings in Wade
and Gilbert.79 While Justice Brennan acknowledged that those cases involved postindictment lineups, he urged that “Wade’s rationale leaves little doubt that the postindictment language was merely descriptive.”80 Brennan also emphasized the need
for counsel at the lineup as a means of protecting the right to confront witnesses at
trial.81 He made explicit that those cases relied on the Confrontation Clause.82
Justice White, a dissenter in Wade and Gilbert, nonetheless also wrote a dissenting
opinion in Kirby and there stated tersely that Wade and Gilbert “govern this case
and compel reversal of the judgment.”83
The Court continued to erode Wade and Gilbert in United States v. Ash.84
There, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, and joined by the other Nixon
appointees the Court held that the right to counsel did not extend to a postindictment photo array85 because it was not a “critical stage” of the criminal
proceedings.86 That, of course, is the language of the Court’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel case law.87 Justice Brennan’s dissent in Ash relied on his analysis
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him.” (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 690 (“We decline to depart from that rationale
today by imposing a per se exclusionary rule upon testimony concerning an identification that took place long
before the commencement of any prosecution whatever.”).
76. Id.
77. See id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring) (“As I would not extend the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary
rule, I concur in the result reached by the Court.”).
78. See id. at 696–97 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]he initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings,’ is completely irrelevant to whether counsel is necessary at a pretrial confrontation for identification
in order to safeguard the accused’s constitutional rights to confrontation and the effective assistance of counsel at
his trial.”).
79. Id. at 684.
80. Joseph D. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the
Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717, 726 (1974).
81. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 695–96.
82. Id. at 696.
83. Id. at 705 (White, J., dissenting).
84. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
85. See id. at 321 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays
conducted by the Government . . .”).
86. See id. at 300 (“A pretrial event constitutes a ‘critical stage’ when the accused requires aid in coping
with legal problems or help in meeting his adversary. Since the accused is not present at the time of the
photographic display, and, as here, asserts no right to be present, there is no possibility that he might be misled
by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary.”); see also id. at 326
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court holds today that a pretrial display of photographs to the witnesses of a crime
for the purpose of identifying the accused, unlike a lineup, does not constitute a ‘critical stage’ of the prosecution
at which the accused is constitutionally entitled to the presence of counsel.”).
87. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37 (quoting Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57
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from Wade and Gilbert, with an emphasis on the resulting inability of counsel to
effectively confront witnesses whose testimony might have been improperly
influenced by a suggestive procedure at the pre-trial identification proceedings.88
Subsequent case law has focused primarily on whether particular procedures
used by the police were unduly suggestive.89 Over time, the Court has made clear
that the standard to be applied—a totality of the circumstances test—is not
especially demanding.90 Justices seem to believe that trial counsel can erode the
jury’s confidence in an eyewitness identification if it was based on a suggestive
one-on-one show up or photo array, and thus not violative of the defendant’s right
to confront the witnesses against him.91
Piece the puzzle together: if, as some courts believed, Brennan’s majority
grounded Wade and Gilbert in the Confrontation Clause, not in the right to counsel
clause, the Court would have resolved cases like Kirby and Ash differently. The
Sixth Amendment right to counsel “trigger,” commencement of formal
proceedings, would be irrelevant. Instead, a court would have to resolve whether
the police procedures rendered cross-examination at trial so ineffective that the
procedures violated the Confrontation Clause.
(1932) (characterizing the post-indictment lineup as a “critical state” of the prosecution such that a defendant is
“as much entitled to such aid (of counsel) as at the trial itself.”); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. at 272
(“[A] post-indictment pretrial lineup at which the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is a critical stage
of the criminal prosecution; that police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the absence of his counsel
denies the accused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and calls in question the admissibility at trial of the incourt identifications of the accused by witnesses who attended the lineup.”); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298
(1967) (holding that confrontation of an accused for identification is a critical stage of criminal proceedings, and
counsel is required at such confrontations).
88. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 326–44 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing, consistent with the
rationale in Wade that counsel’s function at an identification lineup is to “detect the existence of any suggestive
influences” and thereafter “effectively reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred,” in actuality there is “no
meaningful difference, in terms of the need for attendance of counsel, between corporeal and photographic
identifications.”).
89. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (an identification procedure including only
one photograph “may be viewed in general with suspicion,” but the Court found no substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification given the totality of the circumstances); see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220,
229–30 (1977) (finding it “difficult to imagine a more suggestive manner” than an identification procedure where
the victim “was asked to make her identification after she was told that she was going to view a suspect, after she
was told his name and heard it called as he was led before the bench, and after she heard the prosecutor recite the
evidence believed to implicate petitioner.”).
90. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–201 (1972) (finding “no substantial likelihood of
misidentification” in police procedures where, after giving a vague description to police, the witness viewed thirty
to forty photographs over a period of seven months and made no definite identification of any suspect—despite
the Court conceding “the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”).
91. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 116 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384
(1968)) (“Surely, we cannot say that under all the circumstances of this case there is ‘a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification’. . . Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh.”); see also Kansas
v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594, n.* (2009) (holding statements elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment
admissible to impeach defendant’s inconsistent testimony at trial because “[our] legal system. . . is built on the
premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing witnesses.”); United States v.
Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561 (1988) (declining to adopt a clear rule that out-of-court statements of identification
“with the mere possibility of suggestive procedures” are unreliable and violative of Due Process, instead requiring
the question be left to the jury).
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II. STOVALL AND BEYOND
Stovall v. Denno92 was the Court’s third eyewitness identification case decided
in 1967. Many commentators argue that Stovall demonstrates a lack of
commitment to protecting innocent suspects.93 As developed below, while the
decision in Stovall is hard to justify, Foster v. California,94 decided shortly before
Chief Justice Warren stepped down, demonstrated a much greater commitment to
protecting innocent suspects from overly suggestive identification procedures.95
Stovall involved difficult facts. The eyewitness was the victim of a brutal
attack in which her husband was murdered.96 She lay in a hospital bed where she
had just undergone life-saving surgery.97 Five officers surrounded Stovall, the only
African American man in the room.98 He was handcuffed to one of the officers.99
She identified Stovall after an officer directed him to make a “few words for voice
identification.”100 The procedure took place after the postponement of the suspect’s
arraignment so that Stovall could retain counsel.101 At trial, witnesses testified as
to the identification in the victim’s hospital room and also made an in-court
identification of Stovall.102
At issue in Stovall was whether Wade and Gilbert applied retroactively.103 The
Court found that those cases did not apply to cases like Stovall’s that arrived in
front of the Court on habeas corpus (i.e., did not apply retroactively).104
92. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
93. See, e.g., Thomas, Road Not Taken, supra note 11, at 191 (“Thus, the great victory in Wade and Gilbert
turned to ashes, and the losers were not guilty criminal defendants but the innocent who do not need a lawyer but
do need a due process protection against unreliable identifications that is more precise and more robust than the
vague mess that is Stovall.”).
94. 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
95. For a discussion of Foster and Stovall as jurisprudence, see discussion infra. In a more historical vein:
the Court decided Foster on April 1, 1969 and Chief Justice Warren handed down the final decision of his Court
on June 23, 1969. See also JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE, 506
(2006).
96. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 294 (“This case therefore provides a vehicle for deciding the extent to which the rules
announced in Wade and Gilbert—requiring the exclusion of identification evidence which is tainted by exhibiting
the accused to identifying witnesses before trial in the absence of his counsel—are to be applied retroactively.”).
104. See id. at 299–300 (“The overwhelming majority of American courts have always treated the evidence
question not as one of admissibility but as one of credibility for the jury. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in
Criminal Cases 38. Law enforcement authorities fairly relied on this virtually unanimous weight of authority, now
no longer valid, in conducting pretrial confrontations in the absence of counsel. It is, therefore, very clear that
retroactive application of Wade and Gilbert ‘would seriously disrupt the administration of our criminal laws.’
Johnson v. State of New Jersey, at 731, 86 S.Ct., at 1780.”); see also id. at 300 (“At the very least, the processing
of current criminal calendars would be disrupted while hearings were conducted to determine taint, if any, in
identification evidence, and whether in any event the admission of the evidence was harmless error. Doubtless,
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Apart from the Sixth Amendment Wade-Gilbert protections, the Stovall Court
also held that a suspect additionally has a due process right implicated in
eyewitness identification procedures.105 According to Stovall, an eyewitness
identification that is “so unnecessarily suggestive” may violate due process.106 In
light of the totality of the circumstances, a violation would occur if the suggestive
procedures are “conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.”107
Stovall seems indefensible. As Professor Thomas has observed, “[i]t is difficult
to imagine a more suggestive procedure . . . .”108 Only in partial defense of the
decision, the Court relied on the Second Circuit en banc opinion that focused
closely on the extreme circumstances of the case with a victim who might not
survive, suggesting that the urgency to make an identification overrode concerns
regarding what might otherwise be deemed unnecessarily suggestive
procedures.109
The Warren Court revisited Stovall twice. One commentator has argued that
Simmons v. United States110 was the first step leading to the erosion of Stovall’s
already limited protection.111 The Simmons formulation of the due process test was
more pro-prosecution: while Stovall condemned “unnecessarily suggestive”112
procedures such that they were “conducive to irreparable misidentification,”113
Simmons stated that a procedure would have to be “so impermissibly suggestive as
to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”114
Subsequent Burger Court decisions certainly moved even further away from the
language in Stovall.115

too, inquiry would be handicapped by the unavailability of witnesses and dim memories. We conclude, therefore,
that the Wade and Gilbert rules should not be made retroactive.”).
105. See id. at 302–03 (holding that even if a petitioner is not entitled to protection under Wade-Gilbert,
he may be entitled to relief on a claim that the confrontation conducted was “so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law.”).
106. Id. at 302.
107. Id.
108. Thomas, Road Not Taken, supra note 11, at 190.
109. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302 (“‘Here was the only person in the world who could possibly exonerate
Stovall. Her words, and only her words, ‘He is not the man’ could have resulted in freedom for Stovall. The
hospital was not far distant from the courthouse and jail. No one knew how long Mrs. Behrendt might live. Faced
with the responsibility of identifying the attacker, with the need for immediate action and with the knowledge that
Mrs. Behrendt could not visit the jail, the police followed the only feasible procedure and took Stovall to the
hospital room. Under these circumstances, the usual police station line-up, which Stovall now argues he should
have had, was out of the question.’” (quoting Second Circuit Court of Appeals)).
110. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
111. David E. Paseltiner, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection: A Proposal to Return to the Wade
Trilogy’s Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 589 (1987).
112. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
113. Id.
114. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384.
115. See generally Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (holding that while the station-house identification
may have been suggestive, under the totality of the circumstances test the victim’s identification of respondent
was reliable and was properly allowed to go to the jury where a woman identified her assailant as he walked past
her in the police station after being instructed to say “shut up or I’ll kill you” just as her original attacker had
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Despite the different formulation of the test, the other post-Stovall decision
dealing with due process protection in the identification setting demonstrated a
more robust commitment to protecting suspects than did Stovall and post-Warren
Court decisions. Foster v. California,116 decided about two months before Chief
Justice Warren stepped down, and written by Justice Fortas, involved an
eyewitness to a robbery who initially could not make a clear identification of the
defendant.117 The police called the witness to the police station and showed him a
lineup consisting of only three people.118 Foster was about six feet tall and the other
members of the lineup were short, perhaps five feet or five and a half feet tall.119
The witness stated that he thought that Foster’s leather jacket was familiar;
nonetheless, he could not make a definitive identification.120 That inability to
conclusively identify Foster did not change even after the police brought the
witness into a room with Foster for a further interview.121 Only after the police
arranged a second lineup, a week or ten days later, was the witness “‘convinced’
[that Foster] was the man.”122
As in Stovall, Foster could not claim a violation of his right to counsel because
the identification occurred pre-Wade-Gilbert.123 Unlike Stovall and Simmons, the
Court found that the procedure used violated due process, requiring a new trial.124
The Court made clear that such suggestive procedures could lead to conviction of
the innocent.125
Certainly, critics of the Warren Court’s Stovall decision have plenty to
criticize. As Professor Thomas has stated, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a more
suggestive procedure.”126 Two years later, however, the Foster Court demonstrated
a much more rigorous approach to its due process suggestiveness test, an approach
not followed by the Court since the end of the Warren Court.

done); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (holding that “while the identification procedure was
suggestive since only one photograph was used, and while it was unnecessary since there was no emergency or
exigent circumstance, there did not, under the totality of the circumstances, exist a substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification, where the identification was made by a trained police officer who had a sufficient
opportunity to view the suspect, accurately described him, positively identified his photograph, and made the
photograph identification only two days after the crime.”).
116. 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
117. Id. at 441.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 441–42.
123. Id. at 442.
124. Id. at 442–43.
125. Id.
126. Thomas, Road Not Taken, supra note 11, at 190.
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III. WADE, GILBERT, AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: WHAT IF?
As argued above, the Warren Court’s Sixth Amendment analysis seemed
grounded in concerns about protecting innocent suspects.127 That is certainly true
if one views Wade-Gilbert as Confrontation Clause cases. This section lays out
some additional support to what I have argued above, demonstrating that those
cases did take seriously the Confrontation Clause as a basis for the Court’s
holding.128 It also explores some of the confusion generated by the Wade-Gilbert
decisions, notably, concerning counsel’s role at a lineup.129 In addition, it focuses
on Justice Brennan’s suggestion in Wade that legislatures might come up with
alternative protections for suspects forced into lineups.130 Given the fluidity of the
Court’s rationale and explicit concern about avoiding misidentification, I argue
below that the Court, not dominated by law-and-order justices, may well have
evolved Wade-Gilbert in a direction clearly aimed not at formal representation by
counsel but at protecting innocent suspects.131
Above, I cited some of the Confrontation Clause language relied on by Justice
Brennan in Wade.132 There was more:
[T]he confrontation compelled by the State between the accused
and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification
evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and
variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate
from a fair trial. The vagaries of eyewitness identification are
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification.133
The role of counsel in Wade seems akin to the role of counsel in the Miranda
custodial-interrogation setting. Counsel was a means to protect some other
fundamental rights: in Miranda, the Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to
be a witness against oneself,134 in Wade-Gilbert, the Sixth Amendment

127. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (emphasizing the “indispensable” nature of the
presence of counsel because “today’s law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused
by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the
trial itself to a mere formality.”); see also id. at 228 (warning that “the vagaries of eyewitness identification are
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification,” with “the degree of
suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses” being “a major
factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice.”).
128. Infra Part III.
129. Infra Part III.
130. Infra Part III.
131. Infra Part III.
132. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1967).
133. Id. at 227–28.
134. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 436 (1966) (holding “statements obtained from defendants during
incommunicado interrogation in police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of constitutional rights, were
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Confrontation Clause.
Wade also demonstrated recognition of police tactics leading to potentially
false accusations.135 Brennan’s opinion listed numerous examples of highly
suggestive lineups.136 Brennan was explicit:
[As a] matter of common experience [we know] that, once a
witness has picked out the accused at the lineup, he is not likely
to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of
identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all
practical purposes be determined there and then, before the trial.137
He also referred to a then-developing literature about misidentification and the
risk to innocent defendants.138 Of course, today we know far more about the
correlation between misidentification and the conviction of innocent defendants:
as found by an Innocence Project study of exonerated defendants, 77% of those
cases involved misidentification.139

inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”).
135. Wade, 388 U.S. at 234–35 (“The few cases that have surfaced [] reveal the existence of a process
attended with hazards of serious unfairness to the criminal accused and strongly suggest the plight of the more
numerous defendants who are unable to ferret out suggestive influences in the secrecy of confrontation. We do
not assume that these risks are the result of police procedures intentionally designed to prejudice an accused.
Rather, we assume they derive from the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggestibility
inherent in the context of the pretrial identification.”); see also id. at 235 (“The fact that the police themselves
have, in a given case, little or no doubt that the man put up for identification has committed the offense, and that
their chief-preoccupation is with the problem of getting sufficient proof, because he has not ‘come clean,’ involves
a a [sic] danger that this persuasion may communicate itself even in a doubtful case to the witness in some way.”)
(quoting William and Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Part I, 1963 CRIM. L. REV. 479, 483 (1963)).
136. See id. at 232–33 (procedures “for example, that all in the lineup but the suspect were known to the
identifying witness [People v. James, 218 Cal.App.2d 166 (1963); People v. Boney, 28 Ill.2d 505 (1963)], that
the other participants in a lineup were grossly dissimilar in appearance to the suspect [Fredricksen v. United
States, 266 F.2d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1959); People v. Adell, 75 Ill.App.2d 385 (1966); State v. Hill, 193 Kan. 512
(1964); People v. Seppi, 221 N.Y. 62 (1917); State v. Duggan, 215 Or. 151 (1958)], that only the suspect was
required to wear distinctive clothing which the culprit allegedly wore [People v. Crenshaw, 15 Ill.2d 458 (1959);
Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550 (1961); State v. Ramirez, 76 N.M. 72 (1966); State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336
(1927); Barrett v. State, 190 Tenn. 366 (1950)], that the witness is told by the police that they have caught the
culprit after which the defendant is brought before the witness alone or is viewed in jail [Aaron v. State, 273 Ala.
337 (1961); Bishop v. State, 236 Ark. 12 (1963); People v. Thompson, 406 Ill. 555 (1950); People v. Berne, 384
Ill. 334 (1943); People v. Martin, 304 Ill. 494 (1922); Barrett v. State, 190 Tenn. 366 (1950)], that the suspect is
pointed out before or during a lineup [People v. Clark, 28 Ill.2d 423 (1963); Gillespie v. State, 355 P.2d 451
(Okl.Cr. 1960)], and that the participants in the lineup are asked to try on an article of clothing which fits only the
suspect [People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378 (1963)].”).
137. Id. at 228 (quoting Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Part I, 1963 CRIM. L. REV.
479, 482 (1963)).
138. See generally id.
139. Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, 200 Exonerated: Too Many Wrongfully Convicted, THE INNOCENCE
PROJECT AT BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. OF L. 18–19, available at https://www.innocenceproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/ip_200.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
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Further, Justice Marshall’s dissent in Manson v. Brathwaite140 underscores
that, at least in his and Justice Brennan’s view, the 1967 Wade trilogy was to
provide protection against improper identification:
The foundation of the Wade trilogy was the Court’s recognition
of the “high incidence of miscarriage of justice” resulting from the
admission of mistaken eyewitness identification evidence at
criminal trials. . . . Relying on numerous studies made over many
years by such scholars as Professor Wigmore and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, the Court concluded that “[t]he vagaries of
eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal
law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.” . . . It is, of
course, impossible to control one source of such errors the faulty
perceptions and unreliable memories of witnesses except through
vigorously contested trials conducted by diligent counsel and
judges. The Court in the Wade cases acted, however, to minimize
the more preventable threat posed to accurate identification by
“the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the
prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial
identification.”141
Again, this language suggests the primary goal was to protect innocent
suspects.
From inception, the role of counsel in Wade-Gilbert was uncertain.142 Was the
attorney to make contemporaneous objections if a lineup appeared unfair? Was she
to observe potential suggestiveness so that her cross-examination would be more
effective because of her personal observations? Was the attorney to become a
witness at a suppression hearing and to testify about the corrupting influence of
improper police conduct?
Wade suggested that an attorney who witnessed the lineup was in a better
position to engage in meaningful cross-examination.143 In Ash, the Court stated

140. 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977).
141. Id. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 503 (citing Note, 64 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 428, 433 (1973)) (“In
post-indictment line-ups it is not readily apparent what immediate assistance an attorney can provide. He cannot
stop the line-up or see that it be conducted in a certain manner. He can give no legal advice, proffer no defenses,
advance no arguments. The defendant is not in need of legal advice and the lawyer is not in a position to provide
on the spot assistance against the skills of the prosecutor.”).
143. See id. at 499 (“The Court in Wade explained that under past lineup practices, the defense was often
unable ‘meaningfully to attack the credibility of the witness’ courtroom identification’ because of several facts
that militate against developing fully the circumstances of a prior lineup identification by that witness.”); see also
id. (“The intended constitutional foundation of the Wade decision was not entirely clear from the Court’s decision.
The Court talked about the lineup being a ‘critical stage’ at which defendant was as much entitled to counsel as
at trial, which would seem to indicate that Wade was grounded in Sixth Amendment right to counsel. But in
explaining why this was so, the Wade majority referred to the fact that ‘presence of counsel itself can often assure
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that Wade was based on having counsel present because counsel would be “more
sensitive to, and aware of, suggestive influences than the accused himself, and
better able to reconstruct events at trial.”144 But as an observer, counsel may have
relevant information to provide at a suppression hearing.145 That role, of course,
creates problems for defense counsel: according to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, counsel might have to withdraw and become a witness at trial.146
Despite some language in Wade suggesting a limited-observer role for counsel
at the lineup, other language suggests a more active role. Notably, the court stated,
“presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice,”147 and can prevent “the
infiltration of taint in the prosecution’s identification evidence.”148 This suggests
that counsel was supposed to negotiate or otherwise insert herself into the
identification process. Because the Burger Court so effectively cabined Wade and
Gilbert, the Court never had to explain counsel’s role at a lineup.
As the Court did in Miranda, Justice Brennan suggested in Wade that
legislatures might come up with an equally effective remedy to the right to counsel
at the lineup:
Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police
departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional
suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to
meaningful confrontation at trial may also remove the basis for
regarding the stage as ‘critical.’ But neither Congress nor the
federal authorities have seen fit to provide a solution. What we
hold today ‘in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have
this effect.’149
At a minimum, the language suggests that Brennan’s primary concern was the
Confrontation Clause problem, not an independent right to counsel. As indicated,
prior to Kirby, lower courts divided over the meaning of Wade and Gilbert. What

a meaningful confrontation at trial.’ Indeed the Court repeatedly referred to the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation and cross-examination in Wade, suggesting that the decision was grounded in the Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation and cross-examination, with counsel being required simply to give sufficient protection to
that other right.” (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 232 (1967)).
144. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1974).
145. See id. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Wade envisioned counsel’s function at the lineup to be
primarily that of a trained observer, able to detect the existence of any suggestive influences and capable of
understanding the legal implications of the events that transpire. Having witnessed the proceedings, counsel
would then be in a position effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at the lineup, thereby
preserving the accused’s fundamental right to a fair trial on the issue of identification.”).
146. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (2019) (requiring that a lawyer not “advocate at a
trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness” to a contested issue).
147. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236.
148. Id. at 237.
149. Id. at 239.
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if cases emerged in which the Court had to define counsel’s role? What if
experience showed that counsel could not do much to protect suspects from
suggestive influences in lineups?
We know what kinds of procedures are at least as effective as the right to
counsel at a lineup and what kinds are probably more effective.150 Given the
increasing body of literature pointing to the high correlation between the
conviction of innocent defendants and inaccurate eyewitness identification,151
might the Court have pushed law enforcement towards some of the practices
developed in states that have taken seriously the concern about convicting
innocents?
The past decade has seen efforts from around the country.152 Several states
require lineups to be conducted by an independent administrator who does not
know which of the individuals in the lineup is the suspect.153 Some also require
that a person who does identify a suspect specify the level of confidence in making
the identification.154
Some states additionally require that the police tell witnesses that the
150. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 516 (“[I]t seems obvious that similarity of race, physical
features, size, age and dress of lineup participants is a prerequisite to avoidance of suggestion, at least as to
distinctive characteristics described to the police beforehand by witnesses. . .”); see also PATRICK WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 53 (1965) (showing commentators agree that lineups should
contain about six similar participants); see also id. at 70–73 (proposing a prohibition on photographic
identification when a suspect is in custody or a lineup is otherwise feasible [because photo identifications are less
reliable.]).
151. See, e.g., BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011) (finding that 190 in the first 250
DNA-exoneration cases [76%] had at least one erroneous eyewitness identification); Samuel R. Gross at al.,
Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 523, 542 (2005) (arguing
that misidentifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions); see also Comment, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 213, 214 (2002) (“[M]istaken eyewitness identifications were a major cause in sixty of the first eighty-two
DNA exonerations handled by the Innocence Project [73%].”); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE, &
JENNIFER E. DYSART, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 2–4 (2013); Felice J. Levine & June Louin
Tapp, Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap From Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1082
(1973).
152. E.g., Florida passed CS/SB 312-, the Eyewitness Identification, Reform Act, in early 2017. The statute
became effective on Oct. 1, 2017. FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CS/SB 312 - Eyewitness Identification,
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=56856&SessionId=83 (last visited Aug.
20, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
153. See, e.g., Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 92.70(3)(a)(1)-(3) (West) (A lineup “must be conducted by an
independent administrator,” or if not, by using an automated computer program, a blind folder-shuffling
procedure, or any “other procedure that achieves neutral administration and prevents the lineup administrator
from knowing which photograph is being presented to the eyewitness during the identification procedure.”); see
also Illinois, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/107A-2(a)(1) (West) (Lineups shall be conducted by an “independent
administrator, unless it is not practical”); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-284.52(b)(1) (West)
(requiring an independent administrator or the alternatives listed also in Florida’s statute); California, Cal. Pen.
Code § 859.7(a)(2) [Operative Jan. 1, 2020] (requiring identification procedures be conducted using “blind
administration or blinded administration.”).
154. See, e.g., North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-284.52(b)(12) (West) (The independent
administrator must “seek and document a clear statement. . . as to the eyewitness’s confidence level that the
person identified in a given lineup is the perpetrator.”); see also California, Cal. Pen. Code § 859.7(a)(10)(A)
[Operative Jan. 1, 2020] (“The investigator shall immediately inquire as to the eyewitness’ confidence level in
the accuracy of the identification and record in writing, verbatim, what the eyewitness says.”).

884

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51
perpetrator may not, in fact, be in the lineup.155 Other protections include jury
instructions about the fallibility of eyewitness identification and/or the use of
experts to explain the limits of eyewitness identification.156 Some states also
require videotaping of lineups to allow at least some check on improperly
suggestive practices.157
Would the Court have required such remedies? I can only speculate. While
some state courts have required various remedial steps absent legislative
enactment, those courts have usually done so based on their supervisory power,
not on constitutional grounds.158 However, had a post-Warren liberal Court
survived, the Supreme Court might have encouraged or required more effective
remedies than the limited protection afforded by the Wade-Gilbert decisions. If
counsel was, in effect, a remedial device—a prophylaxis—to protect core
Confrontation Clause protections, those cases would have remained significant
because they would have provided meaningful protection against the conviction of
innocent defendants.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Did the Warren Court pay too little attention to protecting innocent
defendants? Its agenda between 1961 and 1969 was ambitious. Many of its
decisions advanced policies other than protecting innocent defendants.159 Most
notably, Mapp’s extension of the exclusionary rule to the states has worked as a
check on abusive police practices.160 For better or worse, Miranda demonstrated a

155. E.g., Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 92.70(3)(b)(1) (West); Illinois, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/107A2(e)(1)(B) (West); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-284.52(b)(3)(A) (West); California, Cal. Pen.
Code § 859.7(a)(4)(A) [Operative Jan. 1, 2020].
156. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 296 (2011) (allowing expert testimony and directing that
“enhanced instructions be given to guide juries about the various factors that may affect the reliability of an
identification in a particular case,” including the witness’s opportunity to view the event and degree of attention,
time elapsed between event and identification, and witness confidence in the identification); see also
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 376 (2015) (requiring, in light of “near consensus in the relevant
scientific community,” instructions be given to provide juries “more comprehensive guidance when evaluating
eyewitness testimony.”); State v. Mahmoud, 147 A.3d 833, 839 (Me. 2016) (holding instructions regarding
eyewitness fallibility may be given, though not required).
157. See Illinois, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/107A-2(h) (“Unless it is not practical or the eyewitness
refuses, a video record of all lineup procedures shall be made.”); see also California, Cal. Pen. Code § 859.7(a)(11)
[Operative Jan. 1, 2020] (“An electronic recording shall be made that includes both audio and visual
representations of the identification procedures.”).
158. See, e.g., Gomes, 470 Mass. at 352 (providing protection against erroneous witness identification
through model jury instructions).
159. This should not be surprising. Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights advance policies other than
protecting the innocent. The Fourth Amendment often protects guilty defendants from improper police conduct.
Any protection of the innocent is the result of deterring police from overreaching. The Fifth Amendment right to
be free from testifying against oneself often prevents access to highly relevant evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
Clearly, one should not suppose protection of the innocent as its primary justification.
160. See SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
1950-1990 51 (1993) (cited with approval in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006)).
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commitment to equality and limited overreaching by the police.161 But, to
characterize the Warren Court as indifferent to protecting innocent defendant’s
overstates the case. Notably, as developed in this article, by using express terms in
the eyewitness identification cases, the Warren Court was clearly concerned with
avoiding convictions of innocent defendants.162
But for President Johnson’s political mistake in attempting to elevate Justice
Fortas, we might well have had a liberal Court well past the 1970’s.163 Of course,
one can only speculate how such a Court would have evolved the eyewitnessidentification case law. Given the Warren Court’s concern with misidentification
of innocent defendants, and Justice Brennan’s repeated references to the
Confrontation Clause,164 might the Court have expanded protection beyond postindictment lineups and developed a more robust protection? I wish we could turn
back the clock and have a do-over.

161. Michael Vitiello, Arnold Loewy, Ernesto Miranda, Earl Warren, and Donald Trump: Confessions
and the Fifth Amendment, 52 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 63 (2019) (scholars debate whether Miranda’s equality concerns
were justified); see also, e.g., Caplan, supra note 5, at 1441 (attacking the underlying premise of Miranda as,
inter alia, an unethical attempt to give suspects a “sporting chance.”). I have questioned Dean Caplan’s position
and argued that equality is an appropriate goal.
162. Supra Part I.
163. Supra Part II & Part III.
164. Supra Part II; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
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